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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLINTON C. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
AMERICAN CASUAL·TY
COMPANY,
Defendant an,d Respondent.

Case No.
10775

STATE,MKNT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff, as an insured under
a group accident insurance policy, to recover benefits
vrovided in the policy for permanent and total disability.

DISPOSITION IN 11 HE LO\VER COURT
At thP pre-trial hearing before the District Court
the court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-

ment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the summary judgment
of tho District Court for defendant and for an order
1

directing summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, or
that failing, for an order remanding the case to tlw
District Court for trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the pre-trial hearing before the District Court,
defendant and plaintiff moved for summary judgment.
For purposes of its motion only and to avoid any issues
of fact, defendant assumed that the facts alleged by
plaintiff were true and contended that as a matter of
law its motion should be granted.
Plaintiff's answers to defendant's interrogatorie:-;
establish that plaintiff intended to rely principally on
his testimony to Pstablish that he received hodily injuries
through accidental means and solely upon thP rnedieRI
testimony of Dr. Kenneth J. Nielson and Dr. K Daniel
~ussbaum to establish that his disability was caused hy
the alleged accident independent of all othn causes.
(Interrogatory No. 1, R. G, and answer thereto, R. 9)
The facts assumed to he true by defendant consist
of the statements made hy plaintiff and Dr. Kenneth .J.
Nielson in their respective depositions (R. 22, 21), both
of which were published prior to the pre-trial hearing,
and by Dr. g_ Daniel Nussbaum in his affidavit (R.
24-25 ).
In July, 19G-+, plaintiff was an t>rnploy<'<> of tlw
State of Utah and was insm·<>d undPr a gronp a<'ciclPnt
2

insnranet>
defrndant.

polie~·

earrit>d by the State of Utah with

At the time of the alleged accident plaintiff was
Pmployed by the State l lealth Department in its building
in a dual capacity as a repairman and a janitor. Approximately five months previous to the alleged accident he
harl bt>Pn Pmployed as a janitor only, a job he had held
for four years, and he definitely considered the duties of
a janitor to be lighter work than the duties of a repairman ( R. 22, pp. 3-4). As a repairman, he was expected
to perform all ty1ws of repair in the building, excluding
only those repairs that he was not technically qualified
to perform (R. 22, p. 6). Pursuant to his job as a
rPpairrnan, he was required for five days, July 13th to
lith inclusive, 1964, seven hours a day, to work on
drilling a hole through an eight-inch cement wall with
a thirty to thirty-five pound eleetric rotary drill to locate
and repair a broken hot water line. Approximately onehalf thP time he worked without help (R. 22, 9-11). This
work caused him to perspire very heavily and to berome completely exhausted.
On Saturday, July 18, 1964, he stayed at home and
l'Pstl:'d. On Sunday, July 19, 19G4, he and his wife drove
to l\Ianti for a family rNmion and returned home that
PV<ming. On that PVPning at approximately 11 :00 o'clock
, P.l\L., plaintiff awakPned with what he described as a
"l'harley horse" in his left hand which soon spread to
Iii:-; lt>ft sidt> and thPn to his whole body (R. 22, p. 15).
During thP tinw it took to rush plaintiff to a local
l1ospital, tlH-'Hl' "charl<-'~· hors<.>s," or seizures, developed
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into grand mal seizures which continued for a period of
twenty-four hours.
Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on .Jul~,
23, 1964, and his doctor released him for return to work
on August 30, 196-±, because "he had had a very satisfactory recovery" (R. 21, p. 1-1). r:Chinking he was ready
(R. 22, p. 23), plaintiff returned to work on Augm;t 30.
1964, and worked until September -±, 1964, during whieh
time his physical condition deteriorat<•d and lw becmw•
unable to perform any typP of physical lahor. Thi~
condition Pxists to the present tinw.
Dr. Nielson cared for plaintiff prior to tlw alleged
accident, during the illness claimed by plaintiff to have
been caused by said accident, and continues to care for
plaintiff now. He testifi(•d at his deposition that at the
time of plaintiff's alleged accidrnt, plaintiff was suffering from several diseases or infirmities, including prior
brain damage and pulmonary emphysema. lfo further
testified that the brain damage was a primary underlying cause of the seizures (R. 21, p. 12) and that the
emphysema restricted plaintiff's vital capacity fifty
percent and was a significant factor in the cause of tllP
seizures ( R. 22, p. 13).
Dr. Nussbaum is of the opinion, as set forth in his
affidavit (R. 2-±-25), that the seizures whiC'h disabled
plaintiff were caused by the interaction of plaintiff '8
damaged brain and the strenuous activity that plaintiff
was engaged in prior to tlw seizures. He also stairs
that had plaintiff not suffered prior brain damage, llP
would not have had the seizures.
4

In granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the District Court made the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law:
1. The pleadings, admissions and affidavits on

fil<' show that then' is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the defendant, American
Casualty Company, is entitled to a judgment that
plaintiff reeover nothing by his claim, as a matter
of law.
2. It clearly appears from the undisputed evidence that plaintiff's total disability was not caused
b~' an accident.
3. If an accid0nt oceurred, it clearly appears
from the undisputed evidence that at the time of
the accident plaintiff was suffering from two dist>ases or infirmitit>s, which cooperated with the accident, if there was an accident, resulting in his disability (R. 13-14).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S TOTAL DISABILITY WAS NOT
CAUSED BY AN ACCIDENT.

On page -1- of plaintiff's brief the insuring terms of
the poli('y as set forth in plaintiff's complaint are recited:
". . . Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries
through aecidental lllf'ans which directly and
independently of all other causes, caused plaintiff
to beeoHH' pen11anently and totally disabled.''
5

The Gtah SuprernP Court has stafod that the tennH
of an insuran('e poliey should be interpreted to mean
what the average man who enters into a rontract with
an insurance eornpany would <'Onsider them to mean.
In other words, the plain, ordinary and popular meaning
in the common speech of man is the meaning to be applied by the courts. Richards v. Standard Acc. !11s. Co.,
58 Utah G22, 200 Pac. 1017, 1020 (1921).
It is submitted in this case that not onl~T 'lrnnld the
common man not understand or consider the events
complained of to constitute accidental means, but thP
plaintiff did not. The following questions and answers
appear on page 9 of plaintiff's deposition (R. 21):

"Q. Now, would you describe for me, please,
what the accidental means were which haw~ caused
this injury?
A. Well, I don't know as I - just how
would I explain that, Gary'" (Gary Theurer, the
plaintiff's attorney)
It is significant that plaintiff is unable without
relying upon his attorney, to explain what the accidental
means were which allegedly occurred. In other words,
even allowing plaintiff's understanding of the meaning
of the terms of the contract to control, rather than the
understanding of the common man, which is a far stricter
test from the defendant's point of view, it is still apparent
that no accident occurrt>d.

From the answer just quoted, dt>fenrlant's eounsd
was still unahlr to dett>rminr what the accident com-
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plained of was and continued the deposition by leading
the plaintiff as follows:
"Q. "\Veil, what constituted this accident~
did the accident occur? What accidental
means trans pi red?
~\Vlwre

A. It was the strenuous labor and in the
confined, hot area that I had to work." (Drilling
the hole in the cement wall)
It is readily apparent that strenuous labor is not
an accident under the plain, ordinary and popular sense
of that word. rsing the guideline of the common man's
understanding of the term accident, the Supreme Court
has defined accident as follffws:

"An accident within a polic~v of accident insurance is an event which takes place without
one's foresight or expectation and which proceeds
from an unknown cause, or an unusual effect of
a known cause not within the expectation of the
person insured, that is to say, the term involves
the happening of nn event suddenly, unforeseen
and unexpected." Billings v. Continental Life Ins.
Co., 81 Utah 572, 21 P.2d 103, 106 (1933). (Emphasis added)
Plaintiff was a repairman; he considered his duties
heavy work, and he continued to do the work which he
now alleg<-'S was an accident for a period of five days
without informing his superiors that he thought the
work was too hard for him to do (R. 21, pp. 28-29). Nor
does plaintiff allege the exhaustion caused by the strenuous labor was an unexpected and unforeseen result of
said labor. To the contrary, plaintiff testified that he
thought the work that he was required to do would nor7

mally result in extreme tiredness and fatigue and that
the job would take him several days to complete (R. 22,
pp. 12, 29, 35).
It is thereforP, abundantly clear that accPpting all
the statements of fact of plaintiff as true and considering them in a light most favorable to plaintiff, that the
event complained of did not happen suddenly, unforeseen or unexpected. Therefore, the District Court did
not err in concluding plaintiff's total disability was not
caused by an accident and in granting sunnuary judgment in favor of defendant.

Authorities supporting the proposition that strenuous labor or exertion resulting in harm does not constitute an accident are found in 10 Couch on Insurance
2d, § 41.136.
However, plaintiff states that he did not foresee or
expect the seizures 01· the resulting effect, the total
disablement (Plaintiff's brief, p. 8). In other words,
plaintiff contends that because the end result or effect
was unforeseeable or unexpt'cted that the means causing
it were accidental. In support thereof, plaintiff cites
Handley v. Mittual Life Ins. Co., 106 Utah 184, 1-17 P.2d
319 (1944). Jn this case action was brought on a double
indemnity provision in a life insurance policy providing
coverage in the event the insured died solely through
accidental means. The insured died from pulmonary
embolism caused by a blood clot following an 01wration
for a hernia. The court allowed recovery saying that
the death was an unexpected result of the operation.
8

However, a close reading of the case shows that the
plaintiff admitted that the flow of the blood clot into
the pulmonary arter~' was an unexpected result of the
operation. And basPd thereon, the court found that the
death wa8 caused by accidental means. 'The rationale
of the II((.ndlry case was more fully explained later by
tlw TTtah 8upreme Court in Kellogg v. California Western States Life Ins. Co., 114 Utah 567, 201 P.2d 949
(1949). The court lw ld in that case that the unexpected
death of the insured ensuing from shock due to an operation did not make the death accidental within the meaning of a double indemnity proyjsion of an insurance
contract. In reaching that decision, the court referred
to the H a11dlry case and said:

"It would seem that if death was an unexpected result of an operation the efficient cause
and effect relationship is not between the intended
act - the operation - and the death, but between
death and :-;ome other intervening cause. In the
Handley ease such an independent cause was
capable of physical ascertainment - the blood
clots. The ca use for them was unknown, but
tlH'Y were not considered as anything necessarily
inht>rent in the nature of the operation. A failure
to link tht>m as necessarily inherent in the operation justified tht> detennination that they were
accidt>ntal - that they were the independent link
in a general chain of causation which was violent,
e.rtrrnal nnd accidental." (Id. at 952) (Emphasis
added)
'l1lms, it is clPar that tlw court in the Handley case
when it said "accidental lllt>ans are those which produce
Pfft>cts which art> not their natural or probable consequenres'' was reforring to the cause of the death - the
9

blood clots - which formed unexpectedly bt'hind the sitfi
of the operation and not to the death as the unexpected
effect. In other words, the Utah Supreme Court requires
an unforeseen, unexpected cause rather than an unforeseen, unexpected result, before accidental means can be
found. Plaintiff claims no such cause other than the
strenuous labor and exhaustion, which he admits was
foreseen and expected.
In each of the following cases, recovery was allowed
on an accident insurance provision after an unforeseen,
unexpected cause of the accident had been found: Whatcott v. Contme.nt<il Casualty Co., 85 Utah 406, 39 P.2d 733
(1935) (insured died during an operation because of an
unforeseen and unexpected hypersusceptibility to anesthesia); Billings v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 81 Utah
572, 21 P.2d 103 (1933) (insured was suddenly and
unexpectedly thrown from truck he was driving and
sustained a severe cut on his finger which later caused
blood poisoning and death); Carter v. Standard Acc.
Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 Pac. 259 (1925) (insured died
from accidentally taking an overdose of laudanum); and
Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 58 Utah
622, 200 Pac. 1017 ( 1921) (insured died from sunstroke
after unexpectedly walking 20 miles during the heat of
day in the desert without sufficient water rather than
riding a horse 12 miles at night with sufficient water
as planned).

Moutzoukos v. Mittual Ben. Health & Accident Assn.,
69 Utah 309, 25-± Pac. 1005 (1927) involved an injury
of an insured which was sustained by him whilP volun-
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tarily lifting a timber in the regular course of his work.
1,his case is not controlling and appears to have been
overrult>d by subsequent cases decided by the Utah
Supreme Court. I.e., Kellogg v. California State Life Ins.
Co., supra.
Other jurisdictions require an unforeseen, unexprcted eause rather than such a result, and have rejected
strenuous labor as such a cause in holding that no accident
occurred. In Ha.rris v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 41 N.J. 565, 197 A.2d 863 (1964), it
was held that a heart attack caused by exertion in performance of insured 's regular work moving heavy tanks
was not within the coverage for disability arising out
of bodily injury sustained as a direct result of an accidPnt. Tlw court said:
"[W]lwre the policy does not, by its language,
give coverage for simply an accidental result but
requires that there be 'something accidental, in
the common and popular sense, in the cause of
the resulting injury, i.e., in the events preceding
and leading up to it' ( 40 N .•J., at p. 526, 193 A.2d,
at p. 225), the language cannot be construed to
insure merely against an accidental result.
\Vhether the preceding events - the means or
cause of the bodily injury resulting - are accidental will be determined by the reasonable
appreciation, understanding and expectation of
the average policy purchaser in light of and having in mind the limiting language of the insuring
clause." (Id. at 864)
In Sniith v. Continental Casualty Company, 203 A.2d
lfi8 (D.C. Cir. 19fi4) action was brought on an accident
policy pursuant to the death of a resident engineer on
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a road project. Following exertion by him of elirnhing
up and dovm an ernhanknwnt to Pxamine bridge footing:-;
he suffered a heart attack and died. In directing a
verdict in favor of defendant, the court said:
"In the case at bar, although the insured's heart
attack was preceded by physical exertion in his
ascent from the excavation incident to his supervisory responsibilities, he neither slipped or fell,
nor was he struck by any falling object, nor was
there any fortuitous event at the time which triggered his heart attack, assuming, argitcndo, but
not conceding that the heart attack could he accepted as a bodily injury contemplated by the
policy. Clearly no accident, in the common acceptance of the term, interfered with his movements at work on the day in question and thereb~'
produced a bodily injury which was the sole,
exciting, efficient and predominant cause of death
of the insured who was normally performing the
duties of his appointment." (Id. at 169)
See also, Hender son i:. Hartford Accidrnt and ]ll
demnity Comparny, 268 N.C. 129, 150 S.E.2d 17 (1966)
(fireman's death due to inhalation of smoke not caused
by an accident).
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff's contention that
the end result is the unexpected and unforeseen element
·which constitutes an accident within the meaning of tht>
policy in question, neither the facts of this cast> nor the
authorities cited by plaintiff would support a reversal
of the District Court's conclusion that no accident O('
curred. It will be shown under POINT [J of the argument of this bri('f that at the time of the aeeident,
plaintiff was suffering from diseases or infirmities of
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which he was fully awan•. rrherefore, plaintiff foresaw
and PxpectPd or should have foreseen and expected that
the activity in which he was voluntarily engaging would
result in an injury to him. Accordingly, under the Utah
law above cited, the end result or the injury could not
lw <'onsiden•d an accident.
POINT II
IF, IN FACT, AN ACCIDENT OCCURRED, THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT PLAINTIFF WAS SUFFERING
FROM TWO DISEASES OR INFIRMITIES WHICH COOPERATING WITH THE ACCIDENT RESULTED IN HIS DISABILITY AND THEREFORE, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
PLAINTIFF IS PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERY.

It has he<>n rerognized by the T"Ttah SuprPme Court
tl1at there are thr<'<' distinct typPs of cases arising under
accident imrnraneP polieies dPaling with the effect of a
disPaS<' or infirrnity of tlw insurPd on the liability of
th<' insurer: ( 1) ~When the accident causes a diseased
condition which, together with the accident, results in
th<> injury or d<'ath complained of, the accident alone
i11 to he considen'd as the cause of the injury or death;
(2) when, at the time of the accident, the insured was sufforing from some disease, hut the disease had no causal
t·onnection with tlw injury or death resulting from the
aecident, the accident is to he considered tlw sole cause;
un w}wn at the tillH' of the accident, there was an existing disea::-;e "·hich, cooperating with the accident, re1-'llltPd in the injnr~· or death, thP accident cannot be
<·onsidPrPd as the sole rause or as the cause independent
of all otlwr causPs. Rrowni11_q v. Equitable Life Assu.r.

13

Soo. of the United States, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1070,
1073-74 (1937).

Plaintiff concedes in his brief on page 12 and plaintiff's doctor testified at his deposition that plaintiff
was suffering from at least two diseases or infirmities
at the time of the accident which cooperated with the
alleged accident to cause the disability.
Dr. Kenneth J. Nielson's testimony is summarized
as follows: Prior to and at the time of the alleged accident, plaintiff was suffering from chronic pulmonary
emphysema which caused permanent scarring and loss
of elasticity of plaintiff's lungs reducing his ability to
inhale and exhale air to fifty percent of a normal person's capacity. Said disease restricted plaintiff from
doing heavy work since that type of work would result
in shortness of breath and rapid heart beat (R. 21, pp.
3-5). Plaintiff was also suffering from incapacitation
of his left arm, a residual impairment from a prior
injury which had left his brain in a damaged condition
(R. 21, pp. 7-10). The relation of the brain damage to
the seizures is stated in the doctor's deposition as
follows:
"Q. Would you be willing to state that had
Mr. Thompson not suffered this brain damage that
he would not have experienced this seizure?
A. Yes." (R. 21, p. 10)
At other points in the deposition, Dr. Nielson testified that the brain damage ·was the primary underlying
cause of the seizures (R. 21, p. 12) and that emphysema
with fifty percent impairment of vital capacity would
14

he a significant factor in the cause of the stroke and
the seizure (R. 21, p. 13). In concluding the direct
examination of Dr. Nielson, reference was made to a
letter addressed to the Utah State Industrial Commission (attached as Exhibit 2 to R. 21) setting forth his
opinion and the opinion of another doctor as to the
cause of the stroke and the resulting disability.

"Q. .Now, with reference to the last paragraph
which I have just read, it is your opinion that at
the time of the alleged accident that Mr. Thompson is complaining of there was an existing
disease or injury which contributed or which
cooperating with the accident resulted in his disability?
A. Yes, there was the underlying disease
and something precipitated obviously.

Q. Is it your opinion that Mr. Thompson
had a damaged brain at the time of the alleged
accident?
A. Yes.
Q. Was this damage caused by his fall from
a horse several years ago?
A. Yes.

Q. Is it your opm10n that Mr. Thompson
was suffering from a pulmonary disease at the
time of the accident f
A. Yes.
Q. Is it your opm1on that the stroke and
seizures complained of were caused by the interarti on of three factors, ( 1) the damaged brain,
( 2) pulmonary disease, and ( 3) strenous activity
that l\fr. Thompson was t'ngaged in a week preceding his stroke'?
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A. Yes. rrhat would probably include th1·
electrolytic imhalancp and activity, the strenuou~
activity.
Q. Your answer is yes, with that addition?
A. Yes." (R 21, pp. 16-17)
Dr. Nussbaum is of tlw opinion that tlw seizures
which disabled the plaintiff WPre causf'd by the intPraction of plaintiff's brain damage and the strenuous
activities plaintiff was engaged in prior to the seizllrPS.
He also states that had plaintiff not suffered prior brain
damage that he would not have had the seizures (R.
24-25).
Dr. Kielson and Dr. Nussbaum are the only meclieal
witnesses upon whom plaintiff intended to rely a.t trial
(Interrogatory No. 1, R. 6 and ans\ver thereto, R. 2)
and the tf'stimony from each of them clearly establishes
that at the time of the alleged accidt>nt plaintiff was
suffering from pre-existing diseast>s or infirmities which
cooperating with the alleged accident resulted in hiti
disability.
In Titcker v. "l\'ew York Lifr' I us. Co., 107 Ftah -i78,
155 P .:2d 173 ( 1945), the deceased insured had fallen
and broken his arm, which fall increased his blood prrssure and caused a dissecting aneurism of the aorta
resulting in his death. ri1he decedent's heirs made a
claim against the insnranee company under a douhlP
indemnity rlause which provided coverag·e upon rpcript
of due proof that the death of tlw insun'd I'Pt·mltPd from
accidental causes. On defendant's appeal from thP trial
eourt's judgnwnt for plaintiff, the Supl'l'11H" Comt ::-:aid

16

tlH· factual problem submitted to the jury for determination was:
'' . . . [vV]hether the deceased died from the
effect of the accident, causing a diseased condition which resulted in death, or whether the decrased, at the tirne of the accident, had an existing
disease u·hich, co-operating with his accident,
resulted in the insured's dea.th." (Id. at 175)
(Emphasis added)
0

In reversing the trial court's decision in favor of
the plaintiff, the Supreme Court relied upon testimony of
a physician called as a witness at the trial which was
a:;; follows:
''Q. Then I take it, Doctor, that it is your
opinion that Mr. Nichols did not have a healthy
aorta? A. It is.
Q. And that tlw aorta was damaged by disease? A. Yes.
Q. And that ~Tour opinion is that the dissection which ultimately resulted in death was caused
by the interaction of two factors - one, the diseased condition of the aorta, and two, an increased
hlood pressllre attending this fall'? A. Yes."

After noting this testimony, the Supreme Court coneluded:
"nfr. Nichols' condition at the time of the
accident was one in which he had had an existing
disease whiC'h co-operated with the accident in
Pausing his death. This compels us to conclude
that the accident eannot be considered the sole
C'anse of irnmred's death, and from this factual
picture, we must C'onclude that this case is one
that falls within tlw third class of cases as set
forth b~· :\[r . .J nstice Larson's opinion in Brown-
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ing v. Equitahh• Life Assur. Society, supra, and
th<> cases there cited." (Id. at 176)
In Clayton 'V. Metropolitan Life Ins. Cu., 96 Utah
331, 85 P.2d 819 ( 1938), the claimant on an msurance
policy, while mowing his lawn fell on the handle of the
mower which hit him in the abdomen, causing him injury
which partially disabled him until an appendix operation
was perf onned. The insurance company appealed the
judgment against it on the grounds that the claimant
had a diseased appendix at the time of the accident
and that this contributed to the disability and should
bar recovery. At trial, the court had instructed the
jury as follows :
"If you believe from all the evidence in the
ease that plaintiff's appendix was in a disease<l
condition and that the accident which occurred
on October 27th lighted up or aggravated a diseased condition or infirmity causing the same to
become active or acute he cannot recover for any
disability resulting therefrom and your verdirt
must be for the defendant." (Id. at 821)

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against
the defendant stating that the jury, pursuant to the
instruction, must have determined that tht> appendix
was not in a diseas<>d condition at the tinw of the accident. It is apparent that the ahove quoted instruction
is a rule of law in Utah with regard to existing diseases
at the time of an alleged accident.
Plaintiff has cited Lee r. Neu.: York Life Ins. Co.,
95 Utah ±-15, 82 P.2d 178 (1938) and White v. National
Postal Tra.rtsport Ass11., 1 l"'.".2d 5, 261 P.2d 92-1: (1953)
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as authority for the proposition that although plaintiff
was afflicted with a disease and an infirmity which
eontributed to his disability, that the disability was still
the result of an accident within the terms of the policy.
In the Lee case, the insured was hit in the abdomen
h~- a tongue of a trailer which he was attempting to disPngage from an automobile. At a later date, it became
necessary to remove his appendix and in so doing it was
found that his gall bladder wa.s infected and that it had
been ruptured at a previous time. A few days after the
appendix operation, the insured died. The doctor testified
the death occurred from the effect of the accidental blow
which ruptured the gall bladder and released the infection to the appendix, making the operation necessary.
The Supreme Court sustained the trial court's verdict
for plaintiff on the theory that the disease in question
was latent or dormant and that had the blow not ruptured the diseased gall bladder, the deceased would not
have suffered any ill effects from the disease. In the
White case the court held that the evidence was sufficient
for a jury to find that an accidental blow to the insured 's
leg reactivated an inactive heart condition which led to
his death, or in the alternative, that the blow started an
nnbroken ehain of eircumstances which led to his death
independently of an~· rontributing cause. The factual
distinctions between the Lee and White cases and the
instant case are obvious. Neither plaintiff's brain damage
nor his pulmonary emphysema rould be classified as
latent or donuant; he was suffering ill effeets from
hoth of them at the time of the accidt->nt, and his medical
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witnesses statP that both of tht>rn contrilmted to
lllJUry.

tltP

First National Bw11k v. Equital;le Life Assur. Soc.
of the Unite,d States, 225 Ala. 58(i, 1-1-1 So. -151 ( 1932)

disallowPd rPcovery becam;p of pre-<.>xisting brain damage of the insured. In that case thP insured fell on th('
floor of his hotel room and, as a rPsult of the fall, died.
Suit was brought under the double in<lt•nmity clause
of a life insurance contract which providl~d coverage if
death orcurred by accident inde1wndent of all other
causes. The evidence established that at the tiine of tht•
fall plaintiff was suffc>ring from a pre-existing brain
infirmity consisting of adhesions to the interior of tlw
skull, a result of a previous blow to the hack of his head.
The medical witnesses concluded that tlw blow on tlw
temple by the fall in the room ruptured the adhesions
leading to menengitis and death. They further agreed
that the fall would not have caused death but for these
adhesions of the brain. In holding for the dt>fendant, tlw
court said because the insured was suffering from a
disease which vv'as accelerated and aggravated by thP
accident so as to lw a cause cooperating with it to produce the fatal end, then' could be no reeovery.
Pre-existing lung diseases including pulmonan·
emphysema of the insured resulted in a disallowancP
of a claim by the insured's administrator on an accident

20

insurance policy in Shulman v. Midual Benefit Health
aud Accident Association, 267 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
The insured suffered a blow on the chest when moving
a heavy object and subsequently died from pneumonia.
The defendant produced evidence from doctors who had
attended the deceased prior to and during his terminal
illness who stated that the alleged injury sustained by
insured was merely an aggravation of pre-existing lung
dist~ases, including chronic bronchitis and pulmonary
Prnphysema. Although one of the doctors advised that
the injury to deceased's sternum which was caused by
the blow undouhtedly interfered with his ability to
breath, tlw court affirmed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of defendant because plaintiff could
not show that the loss of life resulted from the trauma
din·ctly and indqwndently of all other causes.

In Alessandro t'. Jlassachusetts Casualty Ins. Co.,
42 Cal. Rpt. 630 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), the plaintiff
made a elaim against the insuranee company insuring
against accidental bodily injury. On the day in question
he 'ms repairing a refrigerator walk-in box which was
~unken about one foot in the ground and it was necessary to bend forward in an awkward position. ·when he
tried to straight!:'n up he felt as though his body from
the waist down was paralyzed. It was later diagnosed
as a herniat!:'d dise. Based upon the !:'vidence submitted,
the trial judge found that at the time of the alleged accidPnt, plaintiff "·as suffering from degenerative invertehral disc clisPase of the lmnbar spirn• and any disability
~nff<•rpd h.Y appellant was proximately caused by and
1rns a dirPct rPsult of th!:' ::;aid pre-existing disease. In
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sustaining the trial court's holding against the plaintiff,
the appellate court said:
"If no considerable injury at all would have
resultPd had the appellant not been afflicted with
the existing disease or condition, then the accident could not be considered the proximate cause
of the harm, but rather the disease must be so
considered. (Herthel v. Time Ins. Co., 221 Wis.
208, 265 N.W. 575; Egan v. Preferred Ace. Ins.
Co., 223 Wis. 129, 269 N.W. 667, 107 A.L.R. 1107)"
(Id. at 633)

In summary, it is clear from the testimony of both
medical witnesses upon whom plaintiff intended to rely
at trial, that at the time of the alleged accident plaintiff
was suffering from pre-existing diseases or infirmities
which cooperated with the alleged accident resulting in
his disability. Therefore, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law as set forth in the Utah cases
and other authorities cited above and the trial court did
not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.
POINT III
THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF FACT WHICH SHOULD
HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE DISTRICT COURT
WAS NOT ERROR.

It is absolutely clear from the testimony of plaintiff's medical witnesses, as set forth above, that thf'
alleged accident was not the sole cause of the disability
but that tlw pre-existing diseases were contributing
causes. For purposes of its motion for summary judgment, defendant assumed this medical testimony to h(•
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true and there being no issues of fact, the trial court
eorrectly decided the issue as a matter of law and granted
smmnary judgment. Shulman v. Mutual Benefit Health
and Accident Association, supra (court granted summary judgment when evidence established existing disease contributed to injury). For purposes of its motion,
defendant also assumed that plaintiff's statements with
regard to the factual situation surrounding the alleged
accident were true, consequently there was no issue of
fact to be determined hy a jury. Therefore, it was proper
for the court to rule as a matter of law that no accident
occurred. In Harris 1:. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, supra, the plaintiff complained of an
alleged injury occurring while he was engaged in his
work moving two heavy steel tanks from a truck to a
platform. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in reversing a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and directing a judgment in favor of defendant, said:
"vVhere the resultant injury is to the heart,
brought on by reason of exertion from activity,
voluntarily pursued, in which nothing unexpected
or unforseen occurs beyond the injury itself, and
there is nothing which a layman would understand to be an accident, the average policy holder
could not reasonably reach a conclusion of coverage. Therefore, as a matter of law, there is
no issue thereon to be submitted to the trier
of facts and recovery cannot be had.'' ( 197 A.2d
at 864)
However, it is strongly asserted that for purposes
othf>r than its motion for summary judgment, defendant
does not assume or agrPe that the facts as alleged by
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plaintiff or his witnesses are true. To th(~ contrary,
defendant would assert that the circumstances surrounding the alleged accident were far different than those
claimed by plaintiff. For example, plaintiff's supervisor and eo-worker would testify and have testified in
another proceeding (In the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah, Clinton C. Thompson, Plaintiff, vs. The Industrial Commission of Utah, ct al., Defendants, No.
10642, filed June 7, 1966) that the plaintiff worked a
mere six hours on the job in question, that he never
worked alone, that the last time he worked on said job
was over four days before the stroke, and that the work
he did was relatively easy. Further, medical experts
have concluded in the same proceeding that the strenuous labor was in no way connected with or precipitated
the seizures and resulting disability. It is obvious that
if plaintiff accepted these facts as true, as he had to do,
for purposes of his motion for summary judgment, that
the motion could not be granted.

24

CONCLUSION
The District Court in considering all of the evidence
presented did not err in granting summary judgment
for defendant on the alternative grounds that there was
no accident, or if there was an accident, that it was not
the cause independent of all other causes, which rendered
plaintiff totally disabled. Therefore, the District Court's
judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
W. ROBERT WRIGHT
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook
& :McDonough
800 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
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